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Abstract 
One of the goals of the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) debt initiative is 
to provide additional resources for basic health care to the population of eligible 
developing countries. In this paper I investigate the effect of debt relief on per 
capita health expenditure in a sample of developing countries while controlling for 
other factors used in the literature. I find that debt relief has – at the margin – 
little or no effect on health expenditure in countries that are classified as HIPC. 
The level of health expenditures in HIPC countries, however, is significantly 
higher than in other developing countries. On the other hand, countries not 
classified as HIPC increase their per capita health expenditures more than 
proportionally if they receive debt relief. This result is surprising considering that 
per capita amounts of debt relief provided to HIPC countries are on average 
significantly higher than those to Non-HIPC countries. 
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1
“[…] By requiring countries to prepare comprehensive, locally-owned poverty reduction 
strategies, the enhanced HIPC Initiative will also ensure that the proceeds of debt relief 
are directed towards basic health, education and poverty reduction programmes, and are 
not lost in corruption or military spending.” 
Australian Government webpage 1 
 
1  Introduction 
One of the goals of the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) debt initiative is to provide 
additional resources for basic health care to the population of eligible developing countries. 
In this paper I investigate the effect of debt relief on per capita health expenditure in a 
sample of developing countries while controlling for other factors used in the literature. I 
find that debt relief has – at the margin – little or no effect on health expenditure in 
countries that are classified as HIPC. The level of health expenditures in HIPC countries, 
however, is significantly higher than in other developing countries. On the other hand, 
countries not classified as HIPC increase their per capita health expenditures more than 
proportionally if they receive debt relief. This result is surprising considering that per capita 
amounts of debt relief provided to HIPC countries are on average significantly higher than 
those to Non-HIPC countries. 
The interest of policy makers in the composition of public spending is based – at least in 
part – on the argument that increased government spending on health care is an effective 
tool in increasing long-run economic growth and reducing poverty.
2 This argument is 
reflected in the evolution of HIPC debt initiative. Initially, the main goal of the HIPC debt 
initiative in 1996 is to bring eligible countries on a sustainable debt path by providing debt 
relief to eligible countries conditional on the implementation of structural reforms advocated 
by the international financial institutions. Since a review of the HIPC initiative in 1998 
                                                      
1 Quote from the website of the Australian Government Agency AusAID on debt relief and whether debt relief will reach 
the poor (http://www.ausaid.gov.au/hottopics/debt/faq.cfm#willdebt). 
2 Government spending on health care and basic education is considered “pro-poor” in the literature, meaning that these 
expenditures directly contribute to poverty reduction [for example, see Gomanee and Morrissey (2002)]. Revised: August 2005 
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deems the provision of debt relief in the initiative as “too little, too late”, the HIPC initiative 
is “enhanced” in 1999 by speeding up the process for the disbursement of debt relief and by 
making poverty reduction a priority.
3 Eligible countries draft a poverty-reduction strategy 
paper (PRSP) with input also coming from civic society. These strategy papers spell out how 
exactly resources will be allocated to different public sectors to eradicate poverty in the long 
run.
 4 Another recent initiative that focuses on public spending is the declaration of the 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). These goals include proposals to provide 
universal primary education and basic primary health care in developing countries.  
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the effect of those recent initiatives in the affected 
countries on public expenditure. In particular, I focus on the question whether the 
implementation of these and similar initiatives has lead to a significant change in health 
expenditures in developing countries. Furthermore, I investigate whether there are 
differences between countries that are part of the HIPC initiative and those that are not. The 
panel data covers the period 1998 to 2001. The two main contributions of this paper to the 
literature are the inclusion of a debt relief variable as a determinant of health expenditures 
and the investigation of the presence of a differential effect of debt relief on two distinct 
country groups – HIPC countries and Non-HIPC developing countries.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the relevant literature 
for this study. In section 3, the empirical model and methodology are laid out. Section 4 
provides some details on the variables and data sources. The estimation results will be 
presented in section 5. Section 6 concludes. 
 
 
                                                      
3 See International Monetary Fund and World Bank (1998). 
4 “[ ] the enhanced HIPC initiative will boost social spending…”, quote from http://www.worldbank.org/hipc/progress-
to-date/May99v3/may99v3.htm  Revised: August 2005 
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2  Literature Review 
This study builds on earlier work in several strands of the literature. It is most closely related 
to the literature on the determinants of health expenditures. First-generation studies in this 
literature, dealing mostly with developed countries, use cross-country analysis to determine 
which factors are most important with respect to health expenditure. Most of these studies 
find that gross domestic product is the most important determinant of health expenditure 
and also that the income elasticity of health expenditures exceeds one, suggesting that health 
care is a luxury good [Newhouse (1977), Leu (1986), Culyer (1988), Gerdtham et al. (1988, 
1992a, 1992b)]. A concern about omitted variables bias in the earlier literature leads 
researchers to include other variables potentially impacting health expenditures. These 
variables are demographic structure, degree of urbanization, number of physicians, and share 
of public sector provision of health services.
5 The demographic structure of the population 
is proxied by the percentage of the population below 15 and above 65 years of age. Health 
expenditures for these age groups are assumed to be above average. The number of 
physicians is used as a proxy for supplier-induced demand for health services; hence a 
positive sign is expected. Gerdtham et al. (1992b) find that the number of physicians – 
contrary to expectations – has a weakly negative impact on health expenditures. On the 
other hand, an increase in the percentage of the population above 65 years of age has the 
expected positive effect. The results for urbanization in the literature are mixed in the 
literature.
6 It is theoretically not clear how urbanization influences health expenditure. An 
argument for a negative relationship is a higher risk of contagion in more densely populated 
areas. However, urbanization could have a positive effect by reducing travel costs to reach 
the population. Furthermore, access to vital health information is better and preventative 
health education is easier to provide. Further extending the set of explanatory variables, 
Gbesemete and Gerdtham (1992) include percentage of births attended by health staff, crude 
                                                      
5 Leu (1986) argues that based on “some well-known results in the public choice literature” (p.42), a higher share of public 
financing is associated with higher total health expenditure. Subsequent research questions this result, however. See, for 
example, Gerdtham et al. (1988, 1992b). 
6 Leu (1986) finds a positive effect of urbanization on health expenditures, whereas the effect in Gerdtham et al. (1992a) is 
negative. Revised: August 2005 
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birth rate and foreign aid receipts in their empirical analysis.
7 The percentage of births 
attended by health staff is interpreted as “an indirect measure of the extent to which health 
services have reached the people”.
8 Furthermore, the authors find that foreign aid is 
consistently significant and positive. This suggests that foreign aid is effective in sustaining a 
higher resource allocation to the health sector and that it insulates the health care sector – at 
least partially – from budget cuts in times of economic downturns. 
Second-generation studies in this literature use panel data to investigate the dynamic 
relationship between health expenditures and their determinants. For example, Gerdtham 
(1992) applies simple OLS as well as one-way and two-way fixed effects and random effects 
models to health expenditure data for 22 OECD countries from the early 1970s to the late 
1980s. His results are sensitive to the estimation methodology. The author is able to reject 
random effects in the data, and the fixed effect specification is preferred over the alternative 
specifications. Again, gross domestic product is the main determinant of health expenditure. 
Hitiris and Posnett (1992) replicate the analysis of Newhouse (1977) and Leu (1986) with 
panel data and find that – apart from GDP – the demographic structure matters; the higher 
the fraction of the population over age 65 is, the higher are health expenditures, confirming 
the result of Leu (1986). The more recent literature explicitly recognizes the importance of 
institutional variables as determinants of a country’s health expenditures. Gerdtham et al. 
(1998), for example, find that health expenditures are lower for health care systems with 
public reimbursement compared to public contract systems; and for systems with primary 
physicians as gatekeepers for in-patient care. Budget ceilings in ambulatory care, on the other 
hand, have no effect on health expenditures. Barros (1998) applies an alternative approach to 
analyze the determinants of expenditure in health care. Rather than studying the relationship 
of health expenditure and GDP levels, he investigates the link of growth rates of health 
expenditures with GDP growth, as well as the age structure, a gatekeeper variable, and initial 
health expenditure. Only initial health expenditure turns out to be significant, indicating a 
convergence of health expenditure.  
                                                      
7 Since debt relief can be interpreted as an indirect form of aid, the results of that paper are particularly relevant to my 
study. 
8 See Gbesemete and Gerdtham (1992), p.304. Revised: August 2005 
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A second strand of relevant literature deals with the fungibility of foreign aid. Apart from 
geo-strategic considerations, another purpose of foreign aid is to provide government budget 
support to developing nations. Rather than providing general budget support to poor 
countries, donors often earmark funds for particular expenditures for example on primary 
health care or basic education. Nonetheless, these funds are quite fungible. Fungibility is 
defined in the literature as follows: Suppose that a donor and a recipient country agree to 
spend all aid resources on the health sector. If – after the disbursement of aid - the recipient 
country decides to replace (some of) its own government resources initially allocated to this 
sector with foreign aid, then aid is called (partially) fungible. The issue of fungibility was 
recognized early in the development literature.
9 Recently, aid fungibility received prominent 
treatment in the influential World Bank report “Assessing Aid”.
10 The report expresses 
concern about the fungibility of aid and cites some studies providing evidence for the 
existence of fungible aid, but urges donors to accept it as an (unavoidable) reality in their 
planning. The report suggests allocating aid to “good policy” countries to minimize leakage. 
McGillivray and Morrissey (2000), however, question fungibility as an important concern. 
They argue that the effect of aid on overall public sector behavior is more important and 
needs to be investigated in order to improve fiscal management in developing countries. For 
example, in a case study of Pakistan, Franco-Rodriguez et al. (1998) find that aid has a 
weakly positive impact on public investment and a negative impact on tax effort. Particularly 
the negative impact on tax effort is worrisome, since this may have to do with incentive 
effects of providing large inflows of aid funds. Addressing this concern, Franco-Rodriguez 
(2000) applies a fiscal response model in which aid flows are endogenized into government 
spending decisions. Applying this model to data from Costa Rica, she finds that – in contrast 
to the theoretical prediction of her model – government revenue and expenditure barely 
react to an increase in aid inflows.  
Another relevant area of the literature relevant for this study investigates the effectiveness of 
foreign aid in promoting economic growth. The seminal paper in this literature is Burnside 
and Dollar (2000) [henceforth BD]. The authors estimate the impact of aid, an interacted 
                                                      
9 See Little and Clifford (1965). 
10 See World Bank (1998). Revised: August 2005 
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aid-policy term, and a set of control variables on the annual growth rate of gross domestic 
product (GDP) per capita.
11 Using Ordinary and Two-Stage Least Squares, they find that 
“aid has a positive impact on growth in developing countries with good fiscal, monetary, and 
trade policies, but has little effect in the presence of poor policies”. The paper has been 
criticized on several grounds. Subsequent research shows that the results of the BD study are 
sensitive to sample selection and specification and may suffer from omitted variable bias. 
Hansen and Tarp (2000) include a squared aid terms in the regressions to control for 
diminishing returns to aid.
12 Using an instrumental variables approach, they can replicate the 
BD results for their reduced sample, but if outliers removed by BD are included, the aid-
policy-growth link becomes insignificant. Hence, aid effectiveness is independent of policy. 
Hansen and Tarp (2001) are concerned about the presence of country-fixed effects and their 
persistent correlation with macroeconomic policy indicators, both of which would render 
the BD analysis invalid.
13 Furthermore, they argue that endogeneity has not be properly dealt 
with in BD. They suggest using the Arellano-Bond GMM estimator, which takes care of 
country fixed effects by first-differencing and includes aid with different lags as an 
instrument to deal with endogeneity. Using this estimator, the authors find that aid exhibits 
diminishing returns with respect to growth. Guillaumont and Chauvet (2001) argue that 
inclusion of shocks to exogenous factors like terms of trade and climate into the analysis of 
aid effectiveness is essential.
14 The omission of these factors in the BD analysis may have 
lead to overstating the importance of policy. The authors suggest that one of the motivations 
for giving aid is to smooth the effects of negative shocks (for example, a drought) in the 
recipient country. In their 2SLS specification, the authors find that policy doesn’t influence 
the aid effectiveness, whereas aid is significantly more effective in countries more vulnerable 
to shocks. Furthermore, growth rates in countries less vulnerable to shocks are generally 
                                                      
11 The set of control variables includes initial GDP, ethnic fractionalization, number of assassinations, and interaction term 
of ethnicity and assassinations, the Knack and Keefer (1995) measure of institutional quality, M2/GDP to measure financial 
depth, and two region dummies. 
12 See Lensink and White (1999), Hadjimichael et al. (1995), and Durbarry et al. (1998) for different theoretical arguments 
for the non-linear effect of aid on growth.  
13 See Easterly and Levine (1997) and Temple (1998). 
14 The external factors included are trends in terms of trade, stability of agricultural value added and of real value of exports. Revised: August 2005 
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higher. Contrastingly, Collier and Dehn (2001) lend support to the BD result by showing 
that the inclusion of export price shocks into the regression makes their results more robust. 
Additionally, they find that an aid increase in the presence of a negative export price shock 
leads to a higher growth rate. Easterly et al. (2003) extend the original BD data set and show 
that the BD result of aid effectiveness in a good policy environment is sensitive to sample 
period and sample countries, the inclusion of outliers, and alternative definitions of aid and 
good policies.
15 A recent paper by Rajan and Subramanian (2005a) re-examines the cross-
country evidence of the effects of aid on growth. The authors find little evidence of a link 
between the amount of aid inflows and subsequent economic growth, whether negative or 
positive. They test the robustness of the aid-growth relationship using different lags of aid, 
different time frames, multi- and bilateral aid, types of aid, short- and long-term impact of 
aid, different samples, and cross-section and panel specifications. The evidence of aid 
effectiveness is described as weak, whether the aid variable is interacted with a policy 
variable or not. The overall conclusion from this literature is that several aspects of the aid-
growth relationship need to be further investigated to reach conclusive results. The channels 
through which aid influences growth have to be more closely examined. For example, Rajan 
and Subramanian (2005b) offer an explanation how aid can hurt growth instead of 
improving it. Increased aid inflows can lead to overvalued exchange rates, which then lead to 
a loss of competitiveness in the traded sector of a developing nation. As a consequence, this 
loss of competitiveness retards growth in the overall economy, since the (more innovative) 
traded-goods sector is the main driving force of growth in the economy. Their empirical 
evidence supports this hypothesis. In this case, debt relief would be a valid alternative to aid, 
since – as argued before – it is (indirectly) providing additional resources without leading to 
overvaluation of exchange rates. 
In this paper, I am only indirectly concerned about the link between foreign aid and 
economic growth. My main interest lies in investigating the link between debt relief and 
                                                      
15 In another variation of aid-growth regressions, Dalgaard et al. (2004) include the exogenous factor climate represented by 
the fraction of land in the tropics as well as an interaction term for aid and climate. They argue that this variable picks up 
differences in productivity and it also exerts influence on the evolution of institutions. They find that aid is less effective the 
larger the fraction of land in tropical climate is. Revised: August 2005 
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public spending. Interpreting debt (service) relief as a form of foreign aid by providing 
additional resources indirectly through a reduction of the debt (service) burden means that 
debt relief increases resources for public spending. If these resources are invested effectively, 
economic growth will increase and poverty will be reduced. This brings us to the final 
relevant area of the literature that deals with the links between public spending and poverty 
reduction. Poverty reduction will most likely lead to higher economic growth – at least in the 
long run. This brings us to the final area of relevant literature dealing with pro-poor 
spending and its effect on growth. The twin objectives of the enhanced HIPC debt initiative 
– debt sustainability and poverty reduction – make it fairly clear that the focus of 
development assistance has shifted away from pure growth promotion and towards a more 
balanced approach emphasizing social issues. The objective of the enhanced HIPC initiative 
is “to provide a permanent exit from debt rescheduling, promote growth and release 
resources for higher social spending”.
16 Each eligible country has to draft a Poverty-
Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) that identifies “pro-poor” budget expenditure and specifies 
how this expenditure will be increased in subsequent years. Most of the resources “freed up” 
by HIPC debt relief have been directed to the health and education sector, suggesting that 
those sectors are considered to be “pro-poor”.
17 Several studies in this area use health and 
education expenditures as a proxy for pro-poor expenditure.
18 Using infant mortality and the 
Human Development Index as proxies for the welfare of the poor, Gomanee et al. (2003b) 
reach two conclusions. First, an increase pro-poor public expenditure is associated with an 
increase in the welfare of the poor. Second, they find evidence that foreign aid increases 
improves welfare indicators through financing pro-poor spending. Furthermore, Gomanee 
et al. (2003a) suggest that aid is more effective in increasing the welfare of the poor in 
countries with lower welfare indicators. Mooji and Dev (2004) investigate the budget process 
in India. They argue that the rhetoric of politicians involved in the budget-making process of 
allocating resources for social spending beneficial to the poor is only partially matched by 
                                                      
16 See World Bank (2003). 
17 See previous footnote.  
18 See the appendix of Paternostro et al. (2005) for an overview and description of some academic studies on pro-poor 
spending.  Revised: August 2005 
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action. The authors also argue that the shift in focus away from promoting growth towards 
increased social expenditure for the poor may have gone too far. Basic education and health 
care for everyone are worthy goals, but more emphasis needs to be put on creating 
employment opportunities for now healthier and more educated poor. Duncan and Pollard 
(2002) provide a conceptual framework for thinking about priorities in implementing 
poverty reduction as a development strategy. The building blocks for successful 
implementation of poverty-reduction programs are – ordered by importance – civil and 
social order, institutional rules and regulations, good governance, effective markets, pro-poor 
spending, and pro-poor growth and policy intervention. Paternostro et al. (2005) addresses a 
growing concern mentioned previously that the link between increased social expenditure 
and reduced poverty is taken as a fact and that the link from growth to poverty reduction is 
often ignored. Arguing that the literature does not provide much guidance in terms of how 
to allocate resources to different public sectors, they propose a framework unifying 
economic growth theory and public economics principles. This framework is intended to 
provide guidance in determining the impact of public spending on both growth and poverty 
reduction. There is a closely related area of the literature with a narrower focus: How closely 
linked are public expenditures in health and education to improvements in educational 
attainment and health status? Focusing on studies that explore the effect of health 
expenditures on national health status, the empirical evidence is mixed. Numerous studies 
conclude that health status as measured by infant or child mortality is not or only marginally 
affected by public health outlays [Kim and Moody (1992); Musgrove (1996); Filmer and 
Pritchett (1997); Filmer et al. (1998)]. Furthermore, as Filmer and Pritchett (1997) suggest, 
most of the differences in infant mortality can be explained simply by differences in overall 
income level between countries. However, there are also some studies providing empirical 
evidence that health status is in fact positively related to health expenditures [Anand and 
Ravallion (1993); Gupta et al. (2002); Hojman (1996)]. Gupta et al. (2002) suggest that more 
attention needs to be paid to the allocation of funds within the health and education sector. 
For example, they find that public expenditures on health are more effective if spent on 
primary (preventive) rather than secondary (curative) health care. 
 
 Revised: August 2005 
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3  Empirical Model  
In this section I describe the estimation methodology and the function of the explanatory 
variables used in the analysis to determine the consequences of debt relief on health 
expenditures. One problem with international comparisons of health systems is the weak 
theoretical foundation for the determinants of aggregate health expenditures. Theory, 
therefore, provides only little guidance for the choice of reasonable explanatory variables and 
the causalities involved. In the public choice literature, attempts have been made to provide 
a theoretical foundation for aggregate health expenditures [see Buchanan (1965) and Leu 
(1986)]. However, those theories have been criticized by Culyer (1988, 1989) for being 
“(avoidably) highly selective” in the phenomena they try to explain. In this paper, the choice 
of explanatory variables is mostly guided by the previous literature as well as the OECD list 
of core indicators for health.
19  
The regression model is specified as follows: 
''
0 it it x it z i t it yX Z α βγ α φ ε =+ + ++ +  
where  it y  are total health expenditures per capita,  it X  is a vector of the variables of interest, 
it Z  is a vector of control variables,  i α  is a county fixed or random effect,  t φ  is a time fixed 
effect, and  it ε is an i.i.d. error term.  
In order to check for the robustness of regression results, I use Ordinary Least Squares, 
Fixed Effects, and Random Effects estimation techniques. The literature mostly uses OLS, 
but concern about possible omitted variables bias makes a fixed effects model a preferable 
choice. Before going into details about the independent variables, it is important to discuss 
the choice of the dependent variable, total health expenditures per capita (THEpc). The 
reason for using health expenditures instead of health status as my left hand side variable is 
fairly straightforward. The mixed results in the literature about the link between health 
expenditures (input) and health status (output) are only a secondary concern for this paper. 
Recent debt relief initiatives implicitly assume a positive link between the two and are 
                                                      
19 See the OECD website at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/30/28/2754929.pdf  Revised: August 2005 
 
11
therefore primarily concerned about the level of health expenditure. Even though THEpc is 
commonly used in the health expenditure literature, it may not seem an obvious choice for 
another reason. The focus of this paper is to measure the effect of recent debt relief 
initiatives on health expenditures. More specifically, since the debt that is being relieved is 
exclusively public or at least publicly guaranteed, my interest is in how this influences 
government behavior and spending patterns. For data availability reasons, I use THEpc, 
which includes private and public expenditures on health instead of only public health 
expenditure. However, I control for a possible shift in health expenditures from private to 
public or vice versa by including a control variable measuring public health expenditure as a 
share of total health expenditures.
20 
Let me now turn to the explanatory variables included in the regression analysis. The vector 
it X  includes debt relief, a dummy variable for HIPC status, and an interacted variable 
*  HIPC Debt relief . These are the main variables of interest. Many non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) argue that the debt (service) burden on poor countries is one of the 
main reasons these governments are using their scare resources for debt repayment instead 
of social expenditures on health and education. The perception in developing countries is 
that falling into arrears with creditors presumably has much graver consequences for the 
country than neglecting the health and education sector. There are at least two ways to 
address this problem. One is for industrialized nations to increase foreign aid to those highly 
indebted countries thereby providing them with the necessary resources to finance health 
and education outlays. Another way of providing additional resources to developing 
countries – potentially more politically viable due to budget constraints faced by 
policymakers in wealthy countries – is the granting of debt relief. Another advantage of debt 
relief compared to aid is that large aid inflows may lead to an overvalued exchange rate, 
thereby hurting competitiveness of the export sector and consequently growth [Rajan and 
Subramanian (2005a)]. Debt relief, on the other hand, is cutting the outflow of resources 
rather than increasing inflow and its associated problems. As previously mentioned, debt 
relief can function as an indirect form of aid in freeing up resources that otherwise would 
have been used for debt repayment. If this argument holds true and additional resources are 
                                                      
20 See Leu (1986). Revised: August 2005 
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devoted to increasing the health budget, debt service relief is expected to have a positive 
effect on total health expenditures.
21 Resources that otherwise would be used for debt 
service, can now be used for health expenditure. On the other hand, if the resources “freed 
up” by debt service relief are fungible, then health expenditure will not increase at all or 
increase by less than one-to-one. The interacted variable  *  HIPC Debt relief  will allow us 
to distinguish between the effects of debt relief on health expenditures in countries classified 
as heavily indebted poor countries from that in non-HIPC developing countries. The 
dummy variable HIPC controls for differential levels of health expenditures in the two 
countries groups. Additional variables of interest are aid per capita, and debt service. An earlier 
study by Gbesemete and Gerdtham (1992) found that aid positively influences health 
expenditures by providing additional resources above and beyond the regular government 
revenue. Since the government’s capacity to generate tax revenue is limited, high debt service 
payments will also influence public health expenditure negatively.  
In addition to the previously mentioned variables, I include a set of control variables ( it Z ) 
into the regressions that are fairly standard in the literature. The most important variable in 
terms of significance in past studies is per capita gross domestic product (GDP). It serves as 
a proxy for resource availability in an economy. Previous empirical evidence suggests that a 
population’s health expenditure increases with per capita income. Other standard variables 
include the age distribution of the population; the degree of urbanization, the crude birth 
rate, the percentage of births attended by health staff, and the number of physicians per 
100,000 people. The effect of increased urbanization on health expenditures can be positive 
or negative. For example, Schultz (1993) finds that mortality rates in rural households are 
significantly higher than those in urban areas, suggesting that the health status of the urban 
population is higher thereby decreasing health expenditures. On the other hand, one can 
imagine that increased urbanization leads to higher risk of contagion, therefore requiring 
higher health expenditures. The age structure of a society may be an important determinant 
of health expenditure. The utilization of medical services for the population under 15 years 
and above 65 years of age is higher than average. One caveat, especially for developing 
                                                      
21 This argument implicitly assumes that fungibility of resources is not an issue and that developing countries honor the 
commitments made to donor countries. Revised: August 2005 
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countries, is that high child mortality rates may lower the demand for health services in the 
under-15 age group. On the other hand, parents may decide to utilize health services only 
once their children are extremely sick, which will then lead to high medical expenditures. 
Following previous studies, the percentage of births attended by health staff is used as an 
indirect measure for the degree to which health services reach the population. As argued by 
Gerdtham et al. (1992), the number of physicians serves as a proxy for supplier-induced 
health expenditures.
22 However, one can also imagine that the number of physicians is 
endogenously determined by the size of the public health sector. In the context of the 
present empirical analysis, this should not be an issue due to the long lags involved.
23 
Additionally, I include the lagged value of the budget balance, assuming that decisions on health 
expenditures depend on the economic situation of the government. In case of a budget 
deficit, politicians may be more inclined to cut health expenditures in the coming budget 
rather than – say – raise tax rates.  Following a similar argument, I include the per capita growth 
rate of GDP in some specifications. Myopic politicians may divert resources otherwise going 
into health expenditures to other sectors that have a better chance at stimulating short-term 
economic growth. Given the focus in recent development initiatives on poverty, I add a 
variable for the share of the population living below $1/day. Given the correlation between 
wealth and health status, a poorer population suffers from worse health and will therefore 
require higher expenditures on primary health care. The institutional quality measure is similar 
to that of Knack and Keefer (1995) and consists of the sum of three equally weighted 
measures - bureaucratic quality, rule of law, and corruption. A higher number indicates 
better institutional quality. Hence, in an environment with better run institutions, we would 
expect lower health expenditures.  
 
 
                                                      
22 See, for example, Leu (1986) and Gerdtham et al. (1992a, 1992b). 
23 From the decision to become a physician to being one, several years will pass. Revised: August 2005 
 
14
4  Data 
The entire sample contains data on 122 developing countries that are classified as low-
income, lower middle-income, and upper middle-income countries. These countries can be 
further divided into two sub-groups: 39 HIPC countries, and 83 Non-HIPC countries. The 
restriction of the data set to the four year time period 1998 to 2001 is mainly due to data 
availability. However, this coincides with the period where the HIPC debt initiative should 
have the biggest impact on health expenditures. 
Data on the dependent variable – the health expenditures per capita – and on the government 
share of total health expenditure are from the World Health Report 2004 published by the 
World Health Organization. Debt stock, debt service, and the main explanatory variable debt relief 
– which is defined as the sum of principal and interest forgiven in a given year – are from 
the World Bank’s Global Development Finance (GDF) 2005 data set. Data on aid comes 
from OECD International Development Statistics (IDS) 2004 CD-Rom. Budget balance 
data is taken from the International Financial Statistics (May 2005). Debt service, debt stock, and 
the budget balance are expressed as a percentage of GDP. Data on gross domestic product, the 
growth rate of GDP, the share of the population living on $1/day or less, the number of physicians per 
100,000 people, the share of population below 15 years of age and above 65 years of age are all taken 
from the online version of the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI) 2005 
data set. The data on physicians, on births attended by health staff and on poverty are only available 
as 5-year averages from 1998 to 2002. Due to this data restriction, they appears to be time 
invariant, and therefore drop out of the fixed effects regressions. Data on urbanization, the 
crude birth rate, and population are from the United Nations Population Division. All monetary 





                                                      
24 Additional variables that were used in the regression include the variable freedom measuring political rights and civil 
liberties, the adult literacy rate (more educated people are better informed which could lower health expenditures), and life 
expectancy. The coefficient estimates of these variables turned out to be insignificant and are therefore not reported. Revised: August 2005 
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5  Empirical Analysis 
5.1  Descriptive Statistics 
To get a better sense about the data and the differences between the two groups of countries (HIPC 
and non-HIPC countries), descriptive statistics for the variables included in the regressions are 
reported in tables 1 and 2. Starting with per capita health expenditures, we see that health 
expenditure have a much larger range in non-HIPC countries. Average health expenditures in HIPC 
countries are about a sixth of those in non-HIPC which very closely corresponds to the difference in 
incomes (GDP). Hence, on average both groups spend about the same on health in percentage terms 
of gross domestic product. Not surprisingly, we see a large difference in average debt stock and share 
of population living below $1/day. HIPC countries are more than twice as indebted as a percentage 
of GDP and the poverty rate is about three times that of non-HIPC countries. Furthermore, average 
debt relief in HIPC countries between 1998 and 2001 was 5 percent of GDP, whereas it was only 
around 0.4 percent for non-HIPC countries; actual average debt service (in % of GDP), however, 
was very similar. GDP growth and budget balance are comparable in the two groups, which may be 
an indication of success of the initiatives in the late 1990s. Urbanization, births attended by health 
staff, and number of physicians are all higher in non-HIPC countries as we would expect. Overall, 
what becomes clear from the comparison is that the two groups are very different from each other in 
some basic characteristics. Hence, it is not surprising that debt relief had quite distinct consequences 
on health expenditures in the time period considered here for the two groups. 
5.2  Regression Results 
This section presents the results of the regression analysis. In particular, I focus on the 
question whether recent debt relief initiatives had a positive effect on public health 
expenditure. All regressions distinguish between HIPC and non-HIPC countries using a 
dummy variables approach. Additionally, I check the robustness of the results by using three 
different specifications. The first specification includes most of the standard variables used 
in the literature plus the debt relief measure. In the second specification, I drop the debt 
stock variable as an explanatory variable with the idea that this variable has long-term rather 
than short-term effects on public health expenditures. The lagged growth rate of GDP per 
capita is also dropped since it does not seem to play a role in influencing health expenditure 
(at least in the short term). Finally, in the third specification I drop the control variable for 
the share of public expenditure in total health expenditure.  Revised: August 2005 
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The empirical results are reported in Table 3. I find that debt relief has a significantly 
positive effect on health expenditures per capita in countries that are not classified as Heavily 
Indebted Poor Countries. This result is robust across different specifications and also to 
using different estimation methodologies. For example, in the fixed effects estimation, a one 
dollar increase in debt relief is associated with an increase of around 1.60 dollar in per capita 
health expenditures. This may be an indication that debt relief affects current behavior as 
well as expectations about the future. If debt relief – as suggested by the debt overhang 
literature – removes distortions on investment behavior, investment increases, thereby 
creating expectations of higher future growth rates that justify increased health expenditures 
today.
25 Analyzing the situation of HIPC countries, however, my results indicate that a 
positive effect of debt relief for this country group is – for all practical purposes – 
nonexistent. Recalling the descriptive statistics in tables 1 and 2, this result is somewhat 
surprising given the much larger extent of debt relief granted to HIPC countries. This is 
disappointing from a policy perspective. This may be an indication of significant fungibility 
of funds. The resources freed up by debt relief may have been used in other sectors instead 
of leading to additional expenditure in the health sector. Like Gbesemete and Gerdtham 
(1992), the regression also includes foreign aid as an explanatory variable. In contrast to the 
aforementioned study, foreign aid has a negative effect on health expenditures though. This 
result, however, is only significant using the OLS estimation technique. As in most of the 
studies on health expenditures, GDP per capita is a robust and significantly positive 
determinant. An additional dollar of GDP per capita increases health expenditures between 
3 and 7 cents, depending on the estimation technique. This suggests that health expenditures 
in higher income countries are on a higher level. Of the remaining variables, coefficient 
estimates for the degree of urbanization as well as for age distribution are inconclusive and 
contradictory. Urbanization has a positive effect on health expenditure in OLS and random 
effects; in the preferred fixed effects regressions, however, the significance disappears. 
Contradictory to expectations, an increased share of the population belonging to the age 
group under 15 or over 65 has a negative effect on health expenditures in the fixed effects 
regressions suggesting that health expenditures are higher the larger the share of the working 
                                                      
25 See, for example, Krugman (1988) and Sachs (1986) on the effects of debt overhang on incentives of domestic agents. Revised: August 2005 
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age population. Finally, an increase in the number of physicians significantly increases health 
expenditures which is what we expect if the number of physicians is a valid proxy for 
supplier-induced health expenditures; on the other hand an increase in the government share 
of health expenditure leads to a decrease in health expenditure contradicting earlier studies 
that suggest the opposite.
26 The coefficients of other variables commonly used in this 
literature – the crude birth rate, and the percentage of births attended by health staff – are 
insignificant. As explained in the previous section, the fixed effects regression does not 
include the number of physicians per 100,000 people, the percentage of births attended by 
health staff, and the share of the population living on less than one dollar a day as regressors, 
because only averaged data for the sample period is available. The lagged growth rate of 
GDP is used to see whether the public sector adjust its health expenditure with the 
macroeconomic environment. One can imagine that health expenditures are high on the list 
of budget cuts in case of an economic downturn and governments may wish to re-allocate 
resources towards infrastructure investments, for example. My results, however, suggest that 
this is not the case. The coefficient estimates are negative, but not significant. Finally, neither 
institutional quality, nor debt service or debt stock per se play a role in determining the level 
of resources devoted to health care. Apart from the variables reported, I also included a 





6  Conclusion 
In this paper, I have investigated the effects of debt relief on health expenditures in 
developing countries between 1998 and 2001. I find that debt relief was effective in 
increasing health expenditures in some developing countries. However, debt relief for 
countries classified as Heavily Indebted Poor Countries debt initiative – despite being the 
                                                      
26 See Leu (1986). 
27 Other variables included were the degree of democratization, life expectancy, infant mortality, adult literacy rate, as well 
as the contemporaneous values of budget balance and the GDP growth rates. Revised: August 2005 
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main beneficiaries – did not affect health expenditures significantly. There are several 
possible explanations for this result. First, even though the empirical model already accounts 
for differences in debt service and debt stock, these variables may not very precisely capture 
their influence on economic decision-making. There may still be substantial debt overhang in 
HIPC countries even after debt relief, which would make it politically and economically very 
hard to increase expenditures in the health sector under a still back-breaking debt (service) 
burden. Hence, more debt relief would be required to enable these countries to substantially 
increase their expenditures in the health sector. A second explanation could be that – for 
some as yet unaccounted for reason – HIPC countries may have substantially different 
spending priorities from non-HIPC countries. Furthermore, aid fungibility may be a serious 
problem, meaning that aid resources directed to the health sector will simply replace 
government resources. These resources will then be spent on higher priorities of the 
governments, for example, military expenditure or government consumption, or in a worst 
case scenario, will be pocketed by the ruling elites. 
This immediately brings up further questions. Since the empirical model in this paper already 
accounts for debt service, debt stock, and the poverty level, what is the factor that makes 
debt relief more efficient in Non-HIPC compared to HIPC countries? Or – if there are no 
differences in the effectiveness of debt relief with respect to health expenditures between the 
two sets of countries – how have the “freed up” resources been used in HIPC countries? 
Further research in this area is needed to better understand the links between institutional 
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Table 1   Descriptive Statistics. Non-HIPC countries. 
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum
Health expenditure* 171 368.02 306.84 26.00 1523.00
Debt Service Relief* 163 0.37 1.86 0.00 18.23
Debt Service 163 5.61 3.94 0.71 26.45
Aid* 168 27.21 40.33 -7.85 308.05
Income* 168 6,362.87 4,175.84 834.00 18,151.00
Budget Balance 171 -3.13 3.23 -19.66 10.34
Age Distribution 168 0.39 0.05 0.30 0.48
Urbanization 171 50.79 21.31 6.50 91.90
Crude Birth Rate 168 24.04 8.25 8.80 41.70
Birth w/ Health Staff 162 75.68 26.25 11.00 100.00
Doctors 171 125.14 98.63 5.10 439.70
Poverty 125 12.62 15.20 2.00 70.20
Public Health Share 171 53.57 18.23 20.70 93.40
Debt Stock 163 47.35 25.78 6.38 158.28
GDP Growth Rate 171 1.21 3.64 -14.30 7.24
Notes:
* = in per capita terms. 
Short variable descriptions will be included here.   Revised: August 2005 
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Table 2   Descriptive Statistics. HIPC countries. 
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum
Health expenditure* 68 57.87 46.06 11.00 158.00
Debt Service Relief* 68 5.03 13.78 0.00 81.69
Debt Service 64 4.17 2.75 0.88 12.79
Aid* 68 37.08 34.08 1.56 178.78
Income* 64 1,283.64 635.33 447.00 2,575.00
Budget Balance 68 -3.23 3.44 -19.65 5.76
Age Distribution 68 0.47 0.04 0.37 0.53
Urbanization 68 30.34 15.48 7.50 61.90
Crude Birth Rate 68 40.00 8.90 20.20 50.70
Birth w/ Health Staff 64 45.02 17.16 6.00 70.00
Doctors 68 27.92 41.77 1.90 164.40
Poverty 49 37.99 18.48 14.40 72.80
Public Health Share 68 41.25 16.28 10.60 72.40
Debt Stock 64 106.46 50.10 38.53 262.56
GDP Growth Rate 68 1.42 3.88 -10.29 12.18
Notes:
* = in per capita terms. 
Short variable descriptions will be included here.    
Table 3
 
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Debt Relief 10.140*** 9.984*** 8.190** 2.011** 1.961** 1.978** 1.659** 1.596** 1.579*
(3.330) (3.332) (3.599) (0.865) (0.859) (0.847) (0.768) (0.755) (0.833)
HIPC * Debt Relief -10.437*** -10.200*** -8.437** -1.867** -1.857** -1.874** -1.467* -1.500* -1.487*
(3.372) (3.371) (3.643) (0.898) (0.885) (0.873) (0.784) (0.771) (0.848)
HIPC 140.390*** 143.373*** 115.783*** 69.610* 74.265* 68.416
(23.060) (21.387) (22.452) (40.034) (39.174) (43.662)
Debt Service 1.412 2.049 3.44 -0.408 -0.382 -0.424 -0.395 -0.201 -0.178
(2.798) (2.171) (2.339) (1.006) (0.904) (0.896) (0.935) (0.841) (0.831)
Aid  -0.879*** -0.879*** -1.176*** -0.046 -0.045 -0.073 -0.044 -0.031 -0.053
(0.300) (0.292) (0.311) (0.157) (0.154) (0.152) (0.123) (0.119) (0.114)
Income  0.079*** 0.079*** 0.067*** 0.048*** 0.048*** 0.043*** 0.030*** 0.030*** 0.027**
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011)
Budget Balance, t-1 -4.696** -5.038** -2.231 0.887 0.818 0.926 1.101 1.107 1.11
(2.179) (2.171) (2.278) (0.783) (0.765) (0.756) (0.900) (0.882) (0.869)
Age Distribution 8.222* 7.004* 10.510** -1.825 -1.888 -3.62 -9.126** -9.056** -11.368***
(4.223) (3.822) (4.083) (3.296) (3.284) (3.346) (4.135) (4.173) (3.837)
Urbanization 1.031* 1.243** 1.136* 1.770** 1.812** 1.521* -1.099 -1.204 -1.829
(0.559) (0.544) (0.591) (0.865) (0.862) (0.920) (1.252) (1.276) (1.296)
Institutional Quality -8.483 -12.474 4.368 10.551 9.719 7.34 4.398 4.441 3.108
(14.051) (13.360) (14.048) (7.218) (6.976) (6.938) (6.899) (6.313) (6.198)
Birth Rate -3.099 -2.317 -4.082* 1.258 1.251 0.934 0.237 0.08 -0.7
(2.519) (2.226) (2.388) (1.911) (1.903) (1.934) (2.033) (1.944) (1.766)
Births w/ health staff 0.349 0.284 0.057 0.46 0.488 0.306
(0.490) (0.488) (0.528) (0.848) (0.846) (0.925)
Doctors 0.785*** 0.764*** 0.915*** 1.007*** 1.005*** 1.090***
(0.133) (0.127) (0.134) (0.225) (0.224) (0.249)
Poverty 0.855 0.801 1.003* 0.246 0.269 0.374
(0.574) (0.527) (0.570) (1.038) (1.031) (1.143)
Public Share of Health -2.774*** -2.778*** -1.139** -1.221*** -0.604 -0.711
(0.554) (0.555) (0.452) (0.442) (0.509) (0.469)
Debt Stock 0.051 0.092 0.158
(0.300) (0.175) (0.144)
Growth Rate, t-1 -2.451 -0.368 -0.186
(1.617) (0.458) (0.440)
Observations 151 151 151 151 151 151 151 151 151
R-squared 0.93 0.93 0.92 0.99 0.99 0.99
Adjusted R-squared
  Notes: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
short description will be inserted.
Regression Results. Dependent Variable: Total Health Expenditures per capita.
Ordinary Least Squares Random Effects Fixed Effects
 